Buffalo Law Review
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 84

10-1-1958

Domestic Relations—Custody of Children—Per Curiam
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Domestic Relations—Custody of Children—Per Curiam, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 143 (1958).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss1/84

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
strict "same religion" rules,26 to be, of necessity, a narrow term and defined
"when practicable" to mean that when it is possible to arrange an adoption to
foster parents of the same religion as that of the child, adoption to parents of a
different religion is prohibited. This is, in substance, the definition of "when
practicable" as given in subdivsion 5 of section 88 of the New York Domestic
Relations Court Act.
Since courts have disregarded the phrase "when practicable" since 1884, the
dissent derives its chief merit on this foundation of settled policy. However, the
Court of Appeals was never before given the opportunity to construe the policy
of this phrase, and in the writer's opinion has a perfect right to change such
policy, if the decision is based on a better foundation that the historical reason.
The strict "same religion" doctrine is based upon the fundamental right of a
parent to control the upbringing of a child.2 7 After a child is adopted or in the
custody of another, this right of initial parent becomes, in reality, a "dead-hand"
rule. The defenseless in such situations, unless protected by the courts, are the
children. It is this realization that has convinced other jurisdictions that a primary
purpose of any adoption law is to safeguard the welfare of the child and on this
basis this decision is placed. This case is not a whole-hearted acceptance of such
a new policy, because of the vigorous dissent and because of the constant reference
by the majority to the most "unusual circumstances" of this case. This decision
is indicative of an exception to our strict interpretation policy of the strict
"same religion" rule and will probably receive a very restrictive application.
Custody of Children-Per Curiam
In a separation action, the question of justification of physical assaults of
husband on wife and his abandonment of her, together with the fitness of the
mother for the custody of the minor child were questions of fact for the trial
court to determine. The fact that the mother's chosen religion was different from
that to which the child had been earlier exposed was not determinative of the
custody question.28
26. N. Y. Soc. WEL. LAW §373(4) and (5); N. Y. DoM. REL. LAw §112(2).
27. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951), ajf'4 343 U.S.
306 (1951).
28. Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 4 N.Y.2d 521, 176 N.Y.S. 352 (1958).

